Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, __ S.W.3d __ (
Snodgrass v. Snodgrass, __ S.W.3d __ (
In divorce proceedings, the parties agreed on all issues, except for the division of husband’s military retirement. Husband served in the military for approximately 4 years prior to the parties’ approximate 14 year marriage. A hearing was held before a Domestic Relations Commissioner on the division of retirement benefits; however, there is no proof in the record that husband actually received notice of it, waived his right to participate in it, waived his right to have the hearing recorded, or waived any other right or protection on account of his military service. Husband was deployed overseas during the proceedings and unrepresented by counsel. The trial court adopted the DRC’s recommendations and awarded the wife 46% of husband’s retirement. No further activity took place on this matter for over six years. Eight months prior to husband’s retirement, the wife submitted a form to DFAS requesting 46% of husband’s disposable retired pay, with no distinction between marital and nonmarital portions. This translated to wife receiving 82% of the marital portion of the benefit and husband receiving 18%. It was not until his retirement that husband realized something was wrong. He hired counsel and filed a motion for relief pursuant to CR 60.02(f). Due to several procedural and substantive delays, husband’s motion was not heard for another year and a half. The trial court denied his motion, except it did prohibit the wife from receiving any portion of the benefit attributable to husband’s post-divorce increases in rank and pay. Husband appealed.
There are three factors that must be met in order to obtain relief under CR 60.02(f): 1) none of the provisions of CR 60.02 (a)-(e) apply, 2) whether the moving party had a fair opportunity to present his claim at the trial on the merits, and 3) whether the granting of relief would be inequitable to other parties. COA found all three factors weighed in husband’s favor: 1) No evidence supports the applicability of CR 60.02 (a)-(e), 2) Husband lacked the opportunity to be present at the hearing, and 3) Granting relief would not be inequitable to wife because the court had already held that she is only entitled to a share of the marital portion of the retirement benefit and husband did not seek more than that.
The decree that originally awarded wife 46% of the retirement benefits contained no distinction between marital and nonmarital property. Therefore, the decree conflicted with the court’s order denying CR 60.02 (f) relief, which states that wife is only entitled to a share of the marital portion of the benefits, and must be corrected. The decree is also problematic since it did not explicitly first assign each spouse their nonmarital property before dividing the marital property. As a result, it is unclear what the decree intended the outcome to be for the division of military retirement benefits. The COA came up with four different possibilities, and narrowed it down to two using logic and the law: 1) the trial court intended to award wife 46% of the marital portion and 0% of the nonmarital portion, or 2) the trial court intended to award wife 46% of the benefit earned up to the point of divorce, but not what husband earned after the divorce. The COA remanded for the trial court to determine how the decree should be corrected and/or clarified. The COA referred the trial court to DFAS’s pamphlet entitled Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, Dividing Military Retired Pay for guidance and recommended language. When dealing with the division of military retired pay of an as-yet-ineligible service member, COA found the language in section IV.c. of the pamphlet regarding “hypothetical awards” to be consistent with
Next, COA noted that although husband chose to proceed unrepresented by counsel, he was still protected by the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940. Thus, even when a service member does not ask for a stay in the proceedings, the Act requires that the trial court determine that the military service of the party would not have a material, adverse effect upon his rights before going forward.
Finally, COA did not find error in the fact that husband had not appealed the decree or that he waited years to file a CR 60.02 motion. The decree on its face seemed to accomplish what husband wanted and he only realized the error shortly before he retired. Husband promptly acted upon finding the error.
Digested by Sarah Jost Nielsen, Diana L. Skaggs + Associates